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SIXTH AMENDMENT-THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE, WITNESS

MEMORY LOSS AND HEARSAY
EXCEPTIONS: WHAT ARE THE
DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL AND
EVIDENTIARY GUARANTEESPROCEDURE OR SUBSTANCE?
United States v. Owens, 108 S. Ct. 838 (1988).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Owens, I the United States Supreme Court concluded that the admission of prior, out-of-court statements of identification offered when the witness is not able to recall the basis for his
or her identification does not violate the sixth amendment confrontation clause, 2 provided that the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination. 3 The Supreme Court further held that
the confrontation clause does not guarantee that cross-examination
will be successful, but only that there will be an opportunity for effective cross-examination. 4 The Court also concluded that the admission of prior, out-of-court identifications is not violative of
Federal Rule of Evidence 802, 5 provided that the declarant is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement. 6 The Court
opined that the "subject to cross-examination concerning the statement" clause of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) 7 should be
1 108 S. Ct. 838 (1988).
2 The sixth amendment confrontation clause provides, in pertinent part, that, "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 841-43.

4 Id. at 842.
5 Federal Rule of Evidence 802 states: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority or by Act of Congress." FED. R. EvID. 802.
6 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 843-45.
7 Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) states: "A statement is not hearsay if...
(1) the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . (C) one of identification of a person
made after perceiving the person." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C),
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interpreted to mean that as long as a sworn witness is placed on the
stand and voluntarily answers questions, cross-examination is
8
satisfied.
This Note examines the Owens opinion and concludes that,
although the Court achieved the correct result that the confrontation clause and Federal Rule of Evidence 802 were not violated, the
Court's reasoning is erroneous, extreme, and not indicative of legislative history or precedent. This Note argues that the Owens Court
misinterpreted both the case law relating to the history and purposes of the confrontation clause and the legislative history of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C), and thus unjustifiably limited a
defendant's constitutional right of confrontation and evidentiary
right to exclude hearsay. This Note proposes a test for inquiry into
the effectiveness of cross-examination which requires an evaluation
of the totality of the circumstances. Ultimately, this Note concludes
that, in the future, the Court's reasoning could lead to an erroneous
and extreme result. A prior, out-of-court identification made by a
cooperative witness, who has been sworn in and testifies at trial, but
who claims absolutely no recollection of any circumstances surrounding the identification or the basis for the identification, will be
admissible although obviously violative of the meaning of cross-examination under both the sixth amendment confrontation clause
and Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C).
II.

FACTUAL' BACKGROUND

The respondent, James Joseph Owens, was tried and convicted
in the United States District Court for the Central District of California of assault with intent to commit murder of Correctional Officer
John Foster.9 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, the court reversed and remanded. °
The events leading up to the trial were not in dispute. On April
12, 1982, Correctional OfficerJohn Foster was hit over the head and
severely beaten with a metal pipe while he was on duty in the federal
prison in Lompoc, California." Foster, suffering from a fractured
skull and other bodily injuries, was subsequently hospitalized for
nearly one month. ' 2 His beating resulted in severe memory impairment13 and memory loss concerning the attack and regarding his
8 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 844.
9 See Id. at 841.
10 United States v. Owens, 789 F.2d 750, 763 (9th Cir. 1986).

11 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 840-41.
12 Id. at 841.
13 Id.
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visitors during his hospital stay. 14
On April 19, 1982, seven days after the attack, FBI Agent
Thomas G. Mansfield unsuccessfully attempted to question Foster
about the attack. 15 Mansfield found him groggy and lethargic; Fos16
ter had no memory of the name of his assailant.
On May 5, 1982, before Foster was discharged from the hospital,' 7 Mansfield interviewed him again. 18 Mansfield found Foster
much improved and able to describe and answer questions about
the assault. 19 In this interview, Mansfield asked Foster who had attacked him. 20 Foster responded that his attacker was Owens, an in21
mate in the Lompoc prison.
At trial in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Foster testified that, while he could remember
events before the attack, the blows to his head, and the blood on the
floor, he could not remember seeing his assailant. However, Foster
could remember identifying Owens as his attacker during the interview he had had with Mansfield in the hospital in May. 22 Although
Foster had had many other visitors during his hospital stay, 2 3 Foster
could only recall seeing Mansfield. 24 Foster could not remember if
any visitor implied or made suggestions that Owens had been Fos25
ter's assailant.
Counsel for the defense unsuccessfully attempted to refresh
Foster's memory by presenting Foster with hospital records.
Although some of these records indicated that, at one time, Foster
had named a person other than Owens as his assailant, Foster could
remember only the statements he had made to Mansfield. 2 6 In fact,
Foster testified at trial that his statement to Mansfield was "vivid" in
his current memory and that he was also able to remember that
when he made the identification he knew the basis for his identification. 27 However, Foster testified that he could not remember what
Owens,
15 Owens,
16 Id.
17 Owens,
18 Owens,
14

789 F.2d at 752.
108 S. Ct. at 841.
789 F.2d at 752.
108 S. Ct. at 841.

19 Id.

Owens, 789 F.2d at 752.
Id. When Mansfield showed Foster a group of photographs, Foster chose Owens'
picture and identified Owens as his attacker. Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 841.
22 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 841.
23 Foster's wife visited him on a daily basis. Owens, 789 F.2d at 752.
24 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 841.
20
21

25

Id.

26
27

Id.
Owens, 789 F.2d at 753.
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had led him to conclude that Owens was his assailant.2 8
Based on the evidence, Owens was convicted in the district
court of assault with intent to commit murder and was sentenced to
twenty years in prison.2 9 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision.3 0 The court of
l
appeals held that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment
3
3
and Federal Rule of Evidence 80232 were violated when Foster's
out-of-court identification was admitted.3 4 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari3 5 to address the conflict between
the decision of the Ninth Circuit and the decisions of other circuits
concerning the issue of the meaning of cross-examination under the
sixth amendment confrontation clause 3 6 and Federal Rule of Evidence 80237 when the declarant of a prior out-of-court statement of
identification suffers memory loss concerning the basis for his or her
38
previous identification at trial.
III.
A.

SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

JUSTICE SCALIA'S MAJORITY OPINION

In United States v. Owens, 9 the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and held that the admission of a prior
statement of identification made out of court by a witness who suffered memory loss regarding the foundation of the identification is
not contrary to the sixth amendment confrontation clause. 40 Furthermore, according to the Court, admission of the prior, out-of28

Id.

Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 841.
Owens, 789 F.2d at 763.
See supra note 2.
See supra note 5.
33 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 841. The appellate court, however, found the violation of
Rule 802 to be a harmless error. Id.
34 Owens, 789 F.2d at 752-53.
35 United States v. Owens, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987).
36 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Thomas v. Cuyer, 548 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir.
1977)(holding that witness memory loss does not violate the sixth amendment confrontation clause, provided that the witness has been "sworn and made available for crossexamination to the extent possible").
37 See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 565 F.2d 1248, 1252 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 973 (1978)(holding that the failure of the witness to make an in-court identification
did not render the prior, out-of-court identification inadmissible under Federal Rule of
Evidence 802, based on the legislative history of Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(1) ()).
38 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 841.
39 108 S..Ct. 838 (1988).
40 Id. at 845.
29
30
31
32
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court identification does not violate Federal Rule of Evidence 802. 4 1
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, 4 2 stated that, although the
sixth amendment confrontation clause guarantees the accused, in
criminal proceedings, the right to " 'be confronted with the witnesses against him,' "43 this right guarantees only an opportunity to
cross-examine a witness effectively, not effective cross-examination.4 4 Justice Scalia subsequently interpreted the phrase "subject
to cross-examination," found in Federal Rule of Evidence
45
801(d)(1) (C),
to mean that the sworn witness is placed on the
stand and "responds willingly to questions," and no more.46 The
Court concluded that the admission of out-of-court testimony does
not violate either the confrontation clause or Federal Rule of Evidence 802 where there exists memory loss resulting in an inability to
testify at trial as to pertinent facts and events or an inability to testify
to and elaborate upon an out-of-court identification. 4 7 As long as
the witness who made the prior statement of identification is still
able to be placed on the stand and cross-examined, the Court concluded that neither the confrontation clause nor Federal Rule of Evidence 802 is violated. For, according to the Court, the defense has
been afforded an opportunity for cross-examination which satisfies
the requirements of the confrontation clause, 48 and the exception in
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) 49 applies, rendering such a
statement not hearsay. 50
Justice Scalia began the majority opinion of the Court with a
history and description of the sixth amendment confrontation
clause and its development in case law. 5 1 Justice Scalia stated that,
although the sixth amendment confrontation clause has consistently
41 Id.
42 Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by Chief Justice

Rehnquist andJustices White, Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor. Justice Kennedy took
no part in the decision of this case. Id. at 840.
43 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 841 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
44 Id. at 841-42 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1985); Douglas
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)). The Court noted that, Justice Harlan, in his
concurring opinion in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), suggested such an interpretation when he stated that a witness' memory loss concerning a prior or out-of-court
statement " 'does not have Sixth Amendment consequence.'" Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 842
(quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 188 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
45 See supra note 7.
46 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 844.
47 Id. at 845.
48 Id. at 842-43.
49 Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) in general concerns statements which are not
hearsay. FED. R. EVID. 801(d).
50 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 844-45.
51 Id. at 841.
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been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court as providing a
sufficient opportunity to cross-examine "adverse'witnesses," 5 2 the
Supreme Court has never held that the memory loss of a witness
results in a violation of the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment.53 However, the Court added that it had twice left open the
possibility that memory loss could lead to a confrontation clause
54
violation.
For example, Justice Scalia noted that, while the Court in California v. Green55 found testimony given at a preliminary hearing to be
constitutionally admissible when the witness was cross-examined at
the trial, 56 the Court did not rule on the question of whether or not
the witness' out-of-court statements about certain events to a police
officer were admissible when the witness could not remember the
events during the trial. 5 7 However, Justice Scalia stated that Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion in Green spoke to the issue. Justice
Harlan would have held that out-of-court statements about events
are constitutionally admissible under the sixth amendment, even if
the witness cannot remember the statement or the basis for the
statement. 58
52 Id. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1985) (holding that the sixth
amendment confrontation clause affords the accused an opportunity to test witness
memory and allows the jury the opportunity to evaluate the witness' demeanor); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)(holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause guarantees an "adequate opportunity for cross-examination," which is
violated if cross-examination is denied).
53 Owens, 108 S.Ct. at 841.
54 Id. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 168-69 (1 9 7 0)(noting that the issue of
whether the memory loss at trial of a witness with respect to his or her prior, out-ofcourt statement could result in a violation of the confrontation clause was not "ripe for
decision"); Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 17, 21 (1985)(per curiam)(because the
case did not involve the admissibility of a prior, out-of-court statement, but instead involved the admission of expert testimony when the expert cannot remember the basis
for his opinion, the Court did not address whether the declarant's memory loss resulted
in a violation of the confrontation clause).
55 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
56 Id. at 157-64.
57 Owens, 108 S.Ct. at 841-42 (citing Green, 399 U.S. at 168-69). The Green Court
remanded on this issue, stating that neither the state nor the parties considered whether
the witness' loss of memory affected the petitioner's right to cross-examine the witness
and thus violated the sixth amendment confrontation clause. Id. (citing Green, 399 U.S.
at 168-69). However, Justice Scalia noted that the California Supreme Court held, on
remand, that the confrontation clause was not violated when the sworn witness was
cross-examined and observable to thejury. Id. at 842 n.2 (citing People v. Green, 3 Cal.
3d 981, 479 P.2d 998, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494, cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971)).
58 Owens, 108 S.Ct. at 842 (citing Green, 399 U.S. at 188 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
Justice Harlan stated that even a witness with memory loss is available for cross-examination. However, "to the extent that the witness is, in a practical sense, unavailable for
cross-examination on the relevant facts," Justice Harlan would still find no violation of
the sixth amendment confrontation clause. Green, 399 U.S. at 188-89 (Harlan, J., con-
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As a further illustration of the possibility of witness memory
loss leading to a violation of the confrontation clause, Justice Scalia
cited Delaware v. Fensterer.59 In that case, the Supreme Court con-

cluded that, although the expert witness could testify as to his opinion but could not recall the foundation for his opinion, the
confrontation clause was not violated. 60 In justifying its holding,
the Fensterer Court stated:
The Confrontation Clause includes no guarantee that every witness
called by the prosecution will refrain from giving testimony that is
marred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion. To the contrary, the
Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a
full and fair opportunity to probe and expose these infirmities through
cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder
the
6
reasons for giving scant weight to the witness' testimony. '

Justice Scalia added in Owens that an expert witness who cannot remember the basis for his or her opinion can still be discredited, for
the jury may find "'that his opinion is as unreliable as his
memory.' "62

The majority next characterized the main issue in Owens to be
the question left unresolved by the Court in Green. The Court stated
that it must decide the issue of whether the memory loss of a witness
significantly affects cross-examination so as to result in a violation of
the confrontation clause. 63 The answer, according to the Court, is
found in the suggestion made by Justice Harlan in his concurrence
in Green.' 4

Justice Scalia recapitulated that " '[t]he Confrontation Clause
guarantees only "an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not
curring). Justice Harlan did qualify his conclusion by adding that the prosecution must
act reasonably and in good faith to produce a witness before attempting to admit out-ofcourt statements. Id. at 189 n.22 (Harlan, J., concurring).
59 474 U.S. 15 (1985)(per curiam). The Fensterer Court noted that the issue in Fensterer is distinguishable from the issue left open in Green in that only the latter involved
the admission of out-of-court statements. Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 842 (citing Fensterer,474
U.S. at 18). However, Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, found the open issue in
Green to be "quite close" to the main issue in Fensterer, in that while Green involved an
out-of-court statement and memory loss by the witness of that statement, Fensterer involved an out-of-court conclusion and memory loss of the basis for that conclusion.
Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 842 (citing Fensterer,474 U.S. at 23-24 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
60 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 842 (citing generally Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15). The Fensterer
Court held that the confrontation clause guarantees only the opportunity for cross-examination and not successful cross-examination. The opportunity, according to the
Court, involves revealing any "forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion." Fensterer,474 U.S.
at 21-22.
61 Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 21-22.
62 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 842 (quoting Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 19).
63 Id.
64 Id. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever
extent, the defense might wish.' .... 65 Justice Scalia continued by
stating that Fensterer illustrates that the opportunity still exists when
a witness testifies to his or her current belief, but cannot remember
the basis for his or her belief 6 6 Consequently, Justice Scalia reasoned that, as long as the defendant "has the opportunity to bring
out such matters as the witness's bias, his lack of care and attentiveness, his poor eyesight, and even.., the very fact that he has a bad
67
memory," the opportunity for cross-examination is satisfied.
Thus, according to the Court, it follows that because an inquiry into
these matters satisfies the constitutional requirement of an opportunity for cross-examination when a witness testifies as to his or her
current belief, but cannot remember the basis for this belief, the
same inquiry should be constitutionally sufficient when the witness
testifies as to a past belief but cannot remember the basis for this
belief.68 The Court reasoned that, in cases such as these, cross-ex69
amination cannot elicit fror the witness the basis for the belief.
However, there are various methods available to discredit the
70
belief.
Justice Scalia gave two examples of testimony of current and
71
past beliefs coupled with memory loss of the basis for the beliefs.
The Court reasoned that testifying "I believe this to be the man who
assaulted me, but can't remember why" would appear more injurious and thus require further "memory testing" 72 than the statement
"I don't know whether this is the man who assaulted me, but I told
the police I believed so earlier."7 Justice Scalia concluded that
such memory-testing is not necessary in order to achieve an opportunity for effective cross-examination. 74 Instead, according to the
Court, there are other methods which can be used to discredit
65 Id. at 842 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (1987) (quoting Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 20 (emphasis in original)))(citations omitted).
66 Id.
67 Id. Justice Scalia noted that, according to Wigmore, a main purpose of cross-examination is to test the memory of the witness. See 3AJ. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 995 (J.
Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970).
68 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 842.
69 Id.
70 Id. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
71 Id. at 843.
72 Id. The Court qualified this statement by stating that "memory testing" would be
required if such an inquiry is necessary to satisfy the opportunity for effective crossexamination guaranteed by the sixth amendment. Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. Justice Scalia followed Fenstererin which the Court concluded that memorytesting is not the only method of cross-examination which could be used to discredit the
witness. See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19-20 (1985)(per curiam).
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the statement made by a witness with memory loss. Justice Scalia
qualified this assertion by adding that, although the alternative
methods may not always be successful in impugning the witness' testimony, success in cross-examination is not guaranteed by the
75
Constitution.
In the second part of the majority opinion, Justice Scalia recognized that, traditionally, out-of-court identifications would be
characterized as hearsay and that there is somewhat of an overlap
between the requirements of the sixth amendment confrontation
clause and the hearsay rule. 76 The majority then noted that the
court of appeals was aware of, and influenced by, the dangers that
accompany hearsay. Thus, the court of appeals had reasoned that
the Constitution required statements to undergo testing for " 'indicia of reliability' ,77 or "'particularized
guarantees of
trustworthiness.' "78
Justice Scalia disagreed with the analysis of the court of appeals.
According to the majority, inquiries into "indicia of reliability" or
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" are not necessary
"when a hearsay declarant is present at trial and subject to unrestricted cross-examination. ' 79 The Court agreed with Green and
acknowledged that the constitutional requirements of the confrontation clause are satisfied by the oath the witness takes, the opportunity given the defense to cross-examine, and jury observation of the
witness' demeanor.8 0 Thus, Justice Scalia concluded that testimony
by a forgetful witness that he or she had previously believed the defendant was his or her assailant is not constitutionally different,
75 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 843. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. According to
the majority, alternative methods are very real, as illustrated by the argument of counsel
for the respondent that emphasized Foster's memory loss by stating that Foster's hospital visitors suggested to Foster that Owens was the assailant. Id.
76 Id. For the proposition that there is an overlap, Justice Scalia cited California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970). The Court in Green made it clear that the overlap is
not complete and the confrontation clause could not substitute for the hearsay rule and
vice-versa. Thus, according to the Court, there can be a violation of one without a
violation of the other. Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 843.
77 United States v. Owens, 789 F.2d 750, 760-61 (9th Cir. 1986); Owens, 108 S.Ct. at
843 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)). According to the Court in Dutton, "indicia of reliability" determine whether ajury can hear certain testimony so as not
to violate the confrontation clause. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89.
78 Owens, 108 S.Ct. at 843 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)). The
Court in Roberts held that "indicia of reliability" determine whether or not a statement is
admissible. If the statement falls within a hearsay exception, then reliability can be inferred. Otherwise, when reliability is not shown, the statement is inadmissible unless
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" exist. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
79 Owens, 108 S.Ct. at 843.
80 Id. (citing Green, 399 U.S. at 158-61).
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under the confrontation clause, from admission of the witness' prior
statement of identification. 8 '
The Court next answered the respondent's argument that statements concerning identification are subject to certain dangers and
that cross-examination is very important where hearsay testimony is
concerned.8 2 Justice Scalia stated that the respondent did not argue
that Foster's identification was subject to suggestive procedures.
Thus, the Court was unwilling to hold that a "mere possibility of
suggestive procedures" renders out-of-court statements of identification "inherently less reliable than other out-of-court
83
statements."
In answer to the respondent's alternative argument that Federal
Rule of Evidence 802 was violated,8 4 Justice Scalia stated that Federal Rule of Evidence 80285 excludes hearsay, but Federal Rule of
Evidence 801 (d)(1)(C)s 6 is an exception to Federal Rule of Evidence
802.87 The Court further noted that the court of appeals found that

Foster's memory loss precluded him from being "subject to crossexamination concerning the statement."' 8 The Court disagreed
with this construction of "subject to cross-examination concerning
the statement." According to Justice Scalia, a better interpretation
would be that a sworn witness is placed on the stand and willingly
answers questions.8 9 The Court justified its interpretation by comparing Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) with Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(a)(3). 90 The Court noted that Congress was aware
that witness forgetfulness is a "recurrent evidentiary problem," for
81 Id.
82
83
84

Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.

85

See supra note 5.

86

See supra note 7.

87

Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 843.

88

Id. However, the Court mentioned that the court of appeals held that the violation

of the Federal Rules of Evidence was harmless (a "more-probable-than-not" standard
was applied instead of the "beyond-a-reasonable-doubt" standard which applies to confrontation clause violations). Id. at 843-44.
89

Id. at 844. The majority noted that the cross-examination that had occurred in

Owens comports with this interpretation. Furthermore, the Court recognized that the

trial court can place limits on the scope of cross-examination or the witness can assert
the defense of privilege, both of which would diminish the significance of cross-examination. However, the Court qualified these limits by asserting that the memory loss of a
witness does not preclude effective cross-examination. Instead, cross-examination often

results in a finding that the witness has lost his or her memory with respect to a statement which can be used to defeat any effect the previous statement had. This is all that
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) requires with respect to the provision that the
cross-examination must "concern the statement." Id.
90 Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3) states: "(a)

. . .

'Unavailability as a witness'
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Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3) provides for situations of witness memory loss. 9 ' Thus, Congress obviously chose not to include
witness forgetfulness in the exceptions to Federal Rule of Evidence
801 (d)(1)(C).

92

The majority explained that, according to the legislative history
of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C), Congress' basis for the
Rule was that, in general, out-of-court identifications are preferable
to in-court identifications, provided that there are protections
against suggestiveness. 9 3 Thus, the Court concluded that Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d) (1) (C) applies to problems such as the one
in Owens in which a witness' memory loss precludes him or her from
making an in-court identification or from elaborating upon the de94
tails or the foundation for the previous, out-of-court identification.
In answer to the respondent's contention that the Court's interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) creates an inconsistency within the Federal Rules of Evidence, 95 Justice Scalia
stated that this is not a substantive inconsistency but a "semantic
oddity," which is caused by the fact that Federal Rule of Evidence
804(a) describes hearsay exceptions in situations in which the witness will be deemed "unavailable" to provide for convenient referencing to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b). 96 Justice Scalia
continued by asserting that, if the heading of Federal Rule of Eviincludes situations in which the declarant: ... (3) Testifies to a lack of memory of the
subject matter of his statement

91 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 844.

. .

." FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3).

92 Id.

93 Id. In essence, Congress established a preference in favor of out-of-court identifications. Both House and Senate Reports note that, with time, a witness' memory becomes less reliable. Thus, identifications made shortly after perception should be
admitted, for this deters " 'cases falling through because the witness can no longer recall
the identity of the person he saw commit the crime.'" Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 355,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1092, 1094).
See also S. REP. No. 199, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975)(stating that "[b]oth experience
and psychological studies suggest that identifications consisting of nonsuggestive lineups, photographic spreads, or similar identifications, made reasonably soon after the
offense, are most [sic] reliable than in-court identifications .... Their exclusion would
thus be detrimental to the fair administration of justice.").
94 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 844.
95 According to the respondent, if the Court's interpretation were accepted, the witness who forgets is found to be "subject to cross-examination " under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) and, at the same time, "unavailable" under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3). Id. The Court noted that this argument is found in 4J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 801-120 to -121, 801-178 (1987). Owens, 108 S. Ct.

at 844.
96 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 844. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) begins: "The following
are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness

. .

." FED.

R. EVID. 804(b). The situations include privilege, refusing to testify following a court
order to do so, inability to testify because of memory loss, death, physical or mental
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dence 804(a) had been "Unavailability as a witness, memory loss,
and other special circumstances," 97 there would be no visible inconsistency with Federal Rule of Evidence 801 which defines exceptions
98
to hearsay.
Justice Scalia concluded the opinion of the Court by recognizing that the situation in Owens illustrates the "verbal curiosity" that a
witness can be "subject to cross-examination" under Federal Rule
of Evidence 801 (d) (1) and simultaneously "unavailable" under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3). 9 9 However, Justice Scalia concluded that it is obvious that the two phrases pertain to separate
circumstances and are not required or expected to coincide.' 0 0
The Court held that there was no violation of either the sixth
amendment confrontation clause or Federal Rule of Evidence 802
when the trial court admitted an out-of-court statement of identification made by a witness with memory loss who was unable to recall
the basis for his identification. 01 Consequently, the Court reversed
02
and remanded the decision of the court of appeals.'
B.

JUSTICE BRENNAN'S DISSENTING OPINION

Justice Brennan dissented from the Court's opinion. 10 3 Justice
Brennan concluded that the constitutional right of confrontation is
more than the mere procedural protection afforded by the majority.' 0 4 According to the dissent, the sixth amendment guarantees
the defendant in a criminal proceeding the right of cross-examination in order " 'to affor[d] the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for
evaluating the truth of [a] prior statement.' "105 Justice Brennan
illness, and absence from the hearing. Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 844 (citing FED. R. EVID.
804(a)(3)).
97 Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3) is entitled: "Hearsay Exceptions: Declarant
Unavailable. (a) Definition of Unavailability-'Unavailability as a witness' includes situations in which the declarant.. ." FED. R. EvID. 804 (a)(3).
98 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 844-45. Justice Scalia noted that there also is a semantic inconsistency between Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) and Federal Rules of Evidence
801(d)(1)(A),(B) and (C). The majority asserted, for example, that it would be odd for a
witness who claims a memory loss of the underlying facts of his or her testimony from a
previous proceeding to be able to avoid introducing statements from that previous proceeding which are inconsistent with his or her testimony at trial. Id. (citations omitted).
See also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A), quoted infra note 242.
99 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 845.
100 Id.

101
102
103
104
105

Id.
Id.
Justice Brennan was joined by Justice Marshall in dissent. Id. at 845.
Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 845 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 161).
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stated that Owens was denied this guarantee, 10 6 arguing that Foster's severe loss of memory precluded any attempts at cross-examination to determine the "trustworthiness or reliability of the
identification." 1 0 7 Thus, according to the dissent, cross-examination of Foster would not have mitigated some of the dangers associ08
ated with out-of-court testimony.'
Justice Brennan also criticized the Court's narrow holding that
the confrontation clause merely protects the defendant's right to
cross-examine "live witnesses," notwithstanding the witnesses' answers.' 0 9 The dissent argued that, in deciding whether or not to
admit out-of-court testimony, the Court should determine whether
the loss of memory so severely hinders cross-examination that the
jury would not be able to determine the truth of the evidence. 1' 0
Justice Brennan began his analysis by noting that, if Foster had
died from the beating, both the sixth amendment and the Federal
Rules of Evidence would have prohibited Mansfield from testifying
as to Foster's out-of-court statement of identification.1 1 ' However,
Foster lived. His memory, on the other hand, did not. 1 2 Thus,Justice Brennan argued that the John Foster on the stand in 1983 was
not the real witness; instead, the John Foster who had previously
given Mansfield the out-of-court identification of Owens was the witness who took the stand." l3 Because of Foster's memory loss, the
dissent believed that cross-examination would not have helped the
jury in its evaluation of "the trustworthiness or reliability of the
identification."ll4 Indeed, according to the dissent, counsel for the

respondent would not have been able to investigate Foster's " 'lack
106 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 846 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that both "'misperception
and failure of memory'" could not be mitigated by cross-examination of Foster. Id.
(Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Owens, 789 F.2d at 759).
109 Id. at 847 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1 10 Id. at 848 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111 Id. at 845 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that, because of Foster's
memory loss, he could not give anything more than "stale and inscrutable evidence."
This situation, according to the dissent, is analogous to the hypothetical in which Foster
died because of his beating. For, if the court had allowed Mansfield to testify in that
situation, he would have been able to give nothing more than "stale and inscrutable
evidence." Thus, the dissent reasoned that, just as in the latter case, in which Mansfield
would not be allowed to testify as to Foster's out-of-court identification, in the former
case, Foster should also not be allowed to testify. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113 Id. at 846 (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to the dissent John Foster's memory was dead, and thus, Foster was incapable of expounding on his story. Id. (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
114 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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of care and attentiveness'" or "'bad

memory.' "115
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For Foster

could not elaborate upon either his prior identification or the basis
for it.116

Based on its analysis, the dissent directly confronted the
Court's conclusion that there was no violation of the sixth amendment confrontation clause. Instead of asserting that the right to
confront one's witnesses is a "procedural trial right" guaranteeing
the " 'opportunity for effective cross-examination,?",1 117 the dissent ar-

gued that the Court has never held that the confrontation clause
only guarantees the "right,to question live witnesses, no matter how
futile that questioning might be."'I" The dissent continued by noting that prior case law has upheld the notion that the confrontation
clause guarantees " 'an opportunity for effective cross-examination.' "119 Justice Brennan added that, while the Court has never
determined "effectiveness" by success, the Court has also never
"equated effectiveness with the mere opportunity to pose questions."' 20 Instead, the dissent argued, the Court has implied in the
past that effectiveness involves determining whether cross-examination has presented the jury with '" a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement." ' ".121 When crossexamination is not available, according to Justice Brennan, out-ofcourt statements are admissible under the sixth amendment only if
they contain " 'indicia of reliability.' ",122
The dissent then criticized the Court's reliance on Fensterer,123 a
case which the dissent argued did not concern the admission of
115 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 842).
116 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, according to the dissent, '"misperception and
failure of memory'" could not be abated by cross-examination of Foster. Id. (Brennan,
J., dissenting)(quoting United States v. Owens, 789 F.2d 750, 759 (9th Cir. 1986)).
117 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 846 (citations omitted)(emphasis in original)).
118 Id. at 847 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20
(1985)(per curiam)(emphasis added)). Other cases cited by the dissent include: Nelson
v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 629 (1971)(the confrontation clause does not prohibit the admission of an out-of-court statement when the defendant has the "opportunity or the
benefit of full and effective cross-examination"); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,159
(1970)(an out-of-court statement is admissible "as long as the defendant is assured of
full and effective cross-examination at the time of trial"). Owens, 108 S.Ct. at 847 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120 Owens, 108 S.Ct. at 847 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
121 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 161))(citations omitted).
122 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 847 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89).
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
125 Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985)(per curiam).
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prior statements. 124 Justice Brennan stated that the constitutional
guarantee of the confrontation clause is that the defendant will be
able to present the jury with enough information with which it can
"assess[] the validity of the evidence offered."' 25 Consequently, because the expert's memory loss in Fensterer was "self-impeaching,"
the confrontation clause was satisfied.126 Thus, Justice Brennan did
not believe that Fensterer departed from traditional confrontation
clause philosophy.
The dissent further disagreed with the Court's adoption of Fensterer for the principle that "all live testimony as to a witness's past
belief is constitutionally admissible, provided the defendant is afforded an opportunity to question the witnesses."' 2 7 The dissent
criticized this reasoning for erroneously broadening Fensterer's rule.
The dissent argued that, while the memory loss in Fensterer was
"self-impeaching," such a characterization does not extend to all instances of forgetting. 28 According to the dissent's standard for admitting out-of-court statements, 29 Foster's severe memory loss
prevented "meaningful examination or assessment of his out-ofcourt statement," and should not have been admitted. 130
Justice Brennan recognized that the majority might fear that
such an argument could result in a plethora of constitutional challenges to the admissibility of out-of-court statements. However, he
responded that there is no reason for such fear.' 3 1 First, Justice
Brennan stated that cases of complete memory loss, such as Owens, are
rare. Usually, the cases will involve partial memory loss or complete
memory loss coupled with deception, in which the jury can determine the "reliability and trustworthiness of the out-of-court statement."' 3 2 Second, if the jury cannot determine the "reliability and
trustworthiness of the out-of-court statement," the statement is ad124 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 847-48 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Fensterer, the dissent
noted, an expert witness could not remember which scientific theory he had used to
formulate his opinion. Id. at 848 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125 Id. at 848 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that, although the witness' memory of which scientific theory he had used would have resulted in very effective crossexamination, such cross-examination is not the constitutional minimum. Id. (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
127 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129 The dissent argued that determining whether or not to admit out-of-court statements when a memory loss is involved "depend[s] on whether the memory loss so seriously impedes cross-examination that the factfinder lacks an adequate basis upon which
to assess the truth of the proffered evidence." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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missible if it contains "indicia of reliability."' 33 Third, "effectiveness" can be determined for confrontation clause issues in the same
way it is determined with evidentiary issues in order to protect "individual liberty," even at the possible expense of "efficient judicial
3 4
administration."1
The dissent concluded that, while it agreed with the Court that
the confrontation clause does not ensure that every witness will not
give testimony "mhrred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion"
and that giving the defendant "'"a full and fair opportunity to
probe and expose these infirmities through cross-examination I...
satisfies the requirements of the confrontation clause,13 5 the right of
cross-examination primarily functions to " 'promote reliability in
the truth-finding functions of a criminal trial.' "136 Justice Brennan
found cross-examination of Foster to be futile. Thus, according to
the dissent, the majority's holding that Foster's cross-examination
satisfied the requirements of the confrontation clause is a reduction
of "the right of confrontation to a hollow formalism."' 3 7 Consequently, Justice Brennan completed his argument by stating that no
matter how severe a witness' loss of memory is, the confrontation
clause ensures more than the defendant's right to question a "live
38
witness."
IV.
A.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

The sixth amendment confrontation clause guarantees the conId. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 848-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that determining
whether the defendant's opportunity for cross-examination meets the constitutional
standard in cases concerning the confrontation clause is the same inquiry as in cases
involving Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3). Id. at 849 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan disagreed with the Court's reconciliation of Federal Rule of Evidence
804(a)(3) with Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C). Justice Scalia's interpretation
would render a prior identification not hearsay as long as the declarant was subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement, even if the declarant could not remember
the basis for the statement. See Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 844-45. The dissent believed that
Justice Scalia's interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(1)(C) rendered it unconstitutional under the confrontation clause. Thus, Justice Brennan would have held
that Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) requires that the "declarant be subject to crossexamination as to the subject matter of the prior statement." Id. at 849 n.2 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
135 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 849 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 842
(quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985)(per curiam))).
136 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 849 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 107
S. Ct. 2658, 2662 (1987)).
137 Owens, 108 S.Ct. at 849 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133
134
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stitutional right to confront one's witnesses in any criminal trial.13 9

In 1965, the United States Supreme Court held, in Pointer v.
Texas,140 that the confrontation clause provides so fundamental a
right that it applies to the states by means of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution.

41

The scope and purpose of the confrontation clause were explained by the Supreme Court in Mattox v. United States. 14 2 According to the Mattox Court, the essential purpose of the confrontation
clause is:
to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . [from] being used

against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only
of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but
of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they
may look at him and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the
manner4 3in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of
belief. 1

Thus, through cross-examination, the accused is afforded the right
to test the witness' memory and to place the witness on the stand so
that the jury can observe the witness' demeanor and evaluate the
credibility of the witness' testimony. 144 In this way, according to the
Court in Ohio v. Roberts, 14 5 the confrontation clause "exclude[s]
some hearsay" from admissibility. 146
Furthermore, as the Supreme Court stated in Douglas v. Alabama,' 47 cases such as Mattox articulate that the right of cross-examination is included in the confrontation clause and is an essential
guarantee of the confrontation clause.' 48 However, "an adequate
opportunity for cross-examination may satisfy the [confrontation]
14 9
clause even in the absence of physical confrontation."'
More recently, the Supreme Court asserted that "'[t]he main
and essential purpose of confrontation is to securefor the opponent the
See supra note 2.
380 U.S. 400 (1965).
141 Id. at 403.
142 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
143 Id. at 242-43.
144 Id.
145 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (The Court held that a showing of unavailability is required
before a statement made by a hearsay declarant who is not at the trial will be considered
for admissibility. Then, admission of the statement depends on whether the statement
"bears adequate 'indicia of reliability' . . . [or contains] particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.").
146 Id. at 63.
147 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
148 Id. at 418.
149 Id.
139
140
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opportunity of cross-examination.... [C]ross-examination... cannot be
had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers.' "150 To cross-examine is to test the
credibility of a witness' testimony. 15 '
. Such an interpretation exists today in decisions of the Supreme
Court.' 5 2 The Supreme Court has held that the confrontation
clause functions "to promote reliability in the truth-finding functions of a criminal trial"' 15 3 by guaranteeing the defendant the op15 4
portunity to cross-examine opposing witnesses at trial.
Consequently, the sixth amendment confrontation clause "guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the
defense might wish."' 155
B.

FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 801(d)(1)(C)

Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) (1) (C) provides that, if the declarant of an out-of-court statement of identification testifies at trial
and is cross-examined with respect to this statement, the statement
is not hearsay. 15 6 The legislative history surrounding the recommendation of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) by House and
Senate Committees illustrates that the Rule was considered desira57
ble for a variety of reasons.'
150 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974)(quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§.1395 (3d'ed. 1940))(emphasis in original).
151 Davis, 415 U.S. at 316. The Court in Davis stated that "[c]ross-examination is the
principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are
tested." Id.
152 See generally Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2663-64 (1987)(discussing the
history and functions of the confrontation clause); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
156-58 (1970)(discussing the history of the confrontation clause); Delaware v. Fensterer,
474 U.S. 15, 18-20 (1985)(per curiam)(discussing classification of confrontation clause
cases).
153 Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at 2662.
154 Id. at 2664.
155 Fensterer,474 U.S. at 20 (emphasis in original). The Court in Stincer noted that this
"limitation is consistent with the concept that the right to confrontation is a functional
one for the purpose of promoting reliability in a criminal trial." Stincer, 107 S. Ct. at
2664. Thus, while effectiveness is not the standard for cross-examination, at a minimum, reliability is the standard. Consequently, cross-examination must involve something more than mere procedure.
156 See supra note 7.
157 For example, the Senate and House Reports both state that Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) was desirable because of the suggestiveness of the courtroom, because there is a limitation on the admission of the testimony that the declarant be
present at trial and be cross-examined, and because memory fades with time and cases
are not tried immediately due to crowded dockets. H.R. REP. No. 355, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1092, 1094; S. REP. No. 199,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975).
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According to the Report of the House of Representatives, use
of the exception to hearsay must meet two requisites.' 58 First, the
declarant must testify at trial and must be cross-examined concerning the statement. Second, once this requirement is fulfilled, constitutional standards must be met before the prior, out-of-court
identification will be admitted.' 5 9 These constitutional standards
6
are the due process standards of the fifth' 60 and fourteenth' '
amendments to the United States Constitution. Thus, all surrounding circumstances must be considered to ascertain "whether the
identification procedure was 'unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparably mistaken identification.' "162
The rationale behind Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C),
according to the House Report, lies in the fact that in-court identifications can be quite suggestive.' 63 On the other hand, out-of-court
identifications are usually more reliable, for these statements are
often made very soon after the perception, when the declarant's
memory is fresh. With time the memory fades, and because there is
often a great lapse of time between arrest and trial, out-of-court
identifications can lead to increased fairness to defendants because
the accuracy of the statements is ensured.164 Furthermore, memory
loss of a witness would no longer automatically result in dismissal of
a case.

16 5

The Senate discussed the same issue and came to the same conclusions as the House of Representatives.' 66 The Senate Report
noted that studies have shown that identifications made soon after
perception are more reliable than those made in court. Reliability,
in turn, increases fairness.' 6 7 In connection with reliability, the Senate noted that the out-of-court identification usually takes place
before the declarant has been bribed or forced to change his or her
158 H.R. Rep. No. 355, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 2, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1092, 1093.
159 Id.
160

The fifth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that, "[n]o person shall be...

deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.

V.
161 The fourteenth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that, "[n]o state shall...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
162 H.R. REP. No. 355, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1092, 1093 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 691 (1972)).
163 Id. at 3.

164 Id.
165 Id.

166 S.Rep. No. 199, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975).
167 Id.
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mind.1
Consequently, Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) was
adopted as an exception 69 to Federal Rule of Evidence 802.170 The
exception would simultaneously counteract "the generally unsatis17 1
factory and inconclusive nature of courtroom identifications."'
V.
A.

DISCUSSION

AND

LEGAL ANALYSIS

CROSS-EXAMINATION UNDER OWENS

In United States v. Owens, Justice Scalia concluded that the Constitution does not guarantee successful cross-examination. 172 Instead, according to the majority, as long as the defendant is
permitted to expose a variety of factors which a witness may carry
with him or her, such as the witness' prejudices, bad eyesight, inattentiveness, and bad memory, the defendant's opportunity to crossexamine has been satisfied. 173 This interpretation of opportunity,
according to the Court, is the constitutional guarantee. 174 For Justice Scalia, then, the processes of swearing in the witness, cross-examination of the witness, and jury observation of the witness'
demeanor fulfill the requirements of the sixth amendment confron17 5
tation clause.
In formulating his conclusions about the requirements of the
confrontation clause, Justice Scalia relied on California v. Green and
Delaware v. Fensterer, which the Court recognized as not answering
the question of whether an out-of-court statement is admissible
when the declarant suffers memory loss with respect to the basis for
the statement. 176 However, by analogizing the facts of Fensterer to
the facts of the case before the Court, Justice Scalia interpreted Fensterer too broadly, as Fensterer did not involve out-of-court statements, but rather involved the admission of an expert's opinion
when the expert could not recall the basis for his opinion. 177 Fur168 Id.
169 Another exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) 1) (C) is Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(a)(3). See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
170 See supra note 5.
171 28 U.S.C. app. 717 (1982)(advisory committee's notes).
172 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 843.
173 Id. at 842 (citing 3AJ. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 995 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970)).
174 Id. Thus, even though Foster could not recall the basis for his identification of

Owens as his assailant, Justice Scalia held that Owens' rights under the confrontation
clause were not violated, because Owens had the opportunity to bring out factors which
would tend to discredit Foster's testimony. Id. at 842-43. See supra notes 65-70 and
accompanying text.
175 Id. at 843 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158-61 (1970)).

176 Id. at 841-42. The issue was left open until Owens. Id. at 842.
177 Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20-21 (1985)(per curiam).
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thermore, the FenstererCourt stated that it was not deciding the issue
left open in Green, 17 8 as there was not an out-of-court statement involved in the case. 179 Thus, by analogizing Fensterer to Owens, the
majority read Fensterererroneously as deeming all out-of-court statements relating to a witness' past beliefs to be admissible, provided
that the opposing side has the opportunity to question the witness
and elicit any qualities of confusion, evasion, memory loss, or other
discrediting qualities. 180
The Fensterer Court could not have meant such a broad standard
of admissibility, for the Court limited its interpretation of the right
of cross-examination to expert witnesses. The Court stated that
"[q]uite obviously, an expert witness who cannot recall the basis for
his opinion invites the jury to find that his opinion is as unreliable as
18 1
his memory."'
However, expert witnesses offer a special circumstance. Because expert testimony consists of the expert's opinion, if the expert
cannot remember the basis for his or her opinion,. the memory loss
serves to be "self-impeaching."' 182 But, not all memory loss or forgetfulness can be described in this way. 183 For instance, Foster's
statement was not one of opinion, but one of identification.
Although Foster could not recall the basis for his previous identification, statements of identification are not in the same category as
expert opinions. An expert who cannot recall the basis for his or
her opinion may appear to a jury to be less of an expert in the field
than he or she is purporting to be. An ordinary person who cannot
recall the basis for his or her identification, on the other hand, is
merely forgetful. And, in Foster's case, the beating he sustained is
the only reason his memory was severely impaired. 184 When coupled with Foster's ability to recall many of the events surrounding
the attack, such as his injuries, how he was struck on the head, seeing blood on the floor, and jamming his finger into his assailant's
chest,185 Foster's memory loss does not appear to be "self-impeach186
ing," as was the expert's memory loss in Fensterer.
178

See supra note 176 and accompanying text.

179 Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 21.
180

Id. at 2 1-22; Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 848 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

181 Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 19.
182 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 848

(Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Petition for Certiorari at 17-18 n.6, United States v. Owens, 108 S. Ct. 838
(1988)(No. 86-877).
185 Brief for Petitioner at 14, United States v. Owens, 108 S. Ct. 838 (1988)(No. 86877).
186 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 848 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
183
184
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Consequently, Justice Scalia's analogy to Fensterer is not justifiable, and thus Justice Scalia merely begged the question by stating:
If the ability to inquire into these matters [i.e., witness' prejudices, bad
memory, etc.] suffices to establish the constitutionally requisite opportunity for cross-examination when a witness testifies as to his current
belief, the basis for which he cannot recall [as in Fensterer], we see no
reason why it should not suffice when the witness's past belief is intro87
duced and he is unable to recollect the reason for that past belief.'
As previously argued however, such an analogy cannot work, for
Fensterer involved an expert's opinion, while Owens did not. 18 8 By
merely stating that if cross-examination is satisfied in Fensterer, then
it is satisfied in Owens, a similar instance, Justice Scalia neglected to
discuss fully the reasons why Foster's memory loss should be treated
similarly in light of legislative history and precedent. Thus, the
Court left a gap that it never filled, even through its further analysis.
It would have been more logical and instructive for the Court to
have relied upon the history of the confrontation clause and general
trends in the case law, instead of analogizing where no reasonable
analogy exists, to determine the guarantees of the sixth amendment
confrontation clause. As previously noted, the Supreme Court in
Mattox established that the right of confrontation involves cross-examination which affords the accused both an opportunity for memory-testing and the benefit of scrutiny by the jury of the witness'
demeanor. 89 However, successive case law has expanded upon this
definition of confrontation.
For example, the Pointer Court stated that cross-examination is
valuable "in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth in the
trial of a criminal case."19 0 Furthermore, the Court in Stincer stated
that the right of cross-examination functions to "promote reliability
in the truth-finding functions of a criminal trial."' 19 1 The Roberts
Court added that "extraordinary cases" require an "inquiry into the
'effectiveness' " of cross-examination. 9 2 But, the Court further
Id. at 842.
See supra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.
Mattox v. United States, 1'56 U.S. 237, 242 (1985).
190 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
19' Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2662 (1987).
192 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 73 n.12 (1980). Such extraordinary cases involve
unusual circumstances, such as the situation in Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
In Mancusi, the Court found it necessary to evaluate "the character of the actual crossexamination" because the defendant's representation was previously found to be inadequate, for counsel was appointed only four days before trial. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 73 n.12
(citing Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 209). Similarly, the situation in Owens seems to be extraordinary. The facts and Foster's memory of nearly everything except the basis for his previous statement of identification are not commonplace.
187
188
189

000
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noted that inquiring into every case regarding out-of-court testimony would be an exercise in futility and would undermine any
"certainty and consistency in the application of the Confrontation
Clause." 19 3 More recently, the Court in Fensterer noted that an "opportunity for effective cross-examination" is a constitutional
1 94
guarantee.
Justice Scalia failed to recognize and consider these philosophies of cross-examination. Consequently, although the Court
achieved the correct result that the confrontation clause was not violated, it did so in an illogical and presumptive way. The majority
was overly concerned with the procedure of cross-examination and
thus ignored the substance of cross-examination. The Court concluded that, as long as the sworn witness is placed on the stand for
the jury to observe and is cross-examined without restriction, there
is no reason to inquire into the reliability or trustworthiness of the
testimony. 195 However, mere procedure is not constitutionally satisfactory. Even Fenstererstated that the opportunity for cross-examination involves searching for and exposing factors that can damage
testimony, such as "forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion."' 9 6 But,
Justice Scalia would admit out-of-court testimony as long as the de1 97
clarant is placed on the stand, under oath, and cross-examined.
198
and
However, cases such as Owens are probably somewhat rare,
thus, according to Roberts, an inquiry into the effectiveness of the crossexamination that the defense had the opportunity to engage in is in
order.' 99
At a minimum, such an inquiry requires an evaluation of the
totality of the circumstances, including all of the evidence, testimony, facts, and events. Upon an evaluation of Foster's cross-examination, using this totality of the circumstances approach, it appears
that Foster was effectively cross-examined. For purposes of this
analysis, it is important to note several factors surrounding Foster's
cross-examination. First, both the petitioner and the respondent
were in agreement with respect to the events and circumstances of
the attack. 20 0 Second, even though Foster could not remember the
193 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 73 n.12.
194 Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)(per curiam)(emphasis in original).

195 United States v. Owens, 108 S.Ct. 838, 843 (1988).
196 Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 22.
197 Owens, 108 S.Ct. at 843.
198 Id. at 848 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
199 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 73 n.12 (1980).
200 See generally Brief for Petitioner and Brief for Respondent, United States v. Owens,
108 S.Ct. 838 (1988)(No. 86-877)(neither petitioner nor respondent cited facts which
were disputed by the opposing side).
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basis for his identification and could not elaborate upon his prior
identification of Owens as his assailant, Foster was able to recall several pertinent events surrounding the attack, "including the type of
weapon that was used, the injuries he sustained, the location of the
incident, and the fact that he jammed his finger into his assailant's
chest." 20 1 Also, the jury could observe Foster's demeanor while he
was on the stand. Third, counsel for respondent was able to show,
through cross-examination, that Foster could not remember if he
had seen his assailant during the attack. Respondent's counsel used
this fact to discredit Foster's out-of-court identification. 2 02 These
factors all lead to the conclusion that Foster was effectively crossexamined. 20 3 Thus, Owens' rights under the confrontation clause
were not violated.
Indeed, even if the standards of "indicia of reliability" 20 4 and
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" 20 5 are necessary for
effective cross-examination, Owens passes both tests. 20 6 Each of
these inquiries exists as a safeguard when the accused is not confronted by the hearsay declarant at trial because the hearsay declarant's absence from the trial renders him or her unable to be crossexamined at all.2 0 7 Even if these inquiries were applicable to Owens,

a case in which the hearsay declarant was present at trial and participated in cross-examination, Owens would still meet the requirements. First, Foster had no reason to lie or evade questioning. In
20 8
fact, he answered that he did not remember seeing his assailant.
Second, even though Foster could not remember the basis for his
identification, he did remember numerous circumstances surround201 Brief for Petitioner at 14, United States v. Owens, 108 S. Ct. 838 (1988)(No. 86-

877).

Id.
For other pertinent facts and events surrounding the attack, see Brief for Petitioner at 2-9, United States v. Owens, 108 S.Ct. 838 (1988)(No. 86-877).
204 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970). See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
205 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
206 Justice Scalia stated that these inquiries are not necessary. But, he did not say
why. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. By not discussing these inquiries
and thoroughly analyzing case law and legislative history before dismissing the inquiries
as unnecessary when the hearsay declarant is present at trial, Justice Scalia failed to
address a very real and pertinent issue relating to cross-examination. It is, however,
necessary to confront the issue of inquiry, for some cases other than Roberts have cited
the standards relating to "indicia of reliability" and "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." See, e.g., Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89; Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213
(1972).
207 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. See also Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89 ("indicia of reliability.. .
have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed before
the jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant.").
208 United States v. Owens, 108 S.Ct. 838, 841 (1988). See supra text accompanying
note 22.
202
203
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ing the attack, such as seeing blood on the floor, jamming his finger
into his assailant's chest, the fact that a metal pipe was used, what
injuries he sustained as a result of the beating, and where the attack
occurred. 20 9 Taken as a whole and in light of all other corroborating testimony, 2 10 these facts are quite convincing that Foster's outof-court testimony was both reliable and trustworthy.
Constitutional standards demand confrontation, which guarantees "an [opportunity] .. . for effective cross-examination. ' 2 11 Fensterer, itself, which the Court relied upon heavily to justify its
argument that the constitutional guarantee is the simple procedure
of cross-examination, stated that "the Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given afull andfair opportunity to
probe and expose ... [certain]infirmities through cross-examination, thereby
calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant
21 2
weight to the witness' testimony."
"[A] full and fair opportunity to probe and expose these infirmities through cross-examination" is exactly what the totality of the
circumstances approach is designed to guarantee. It ensures that
the jury has reason to impute great weight to the declarant's testimony or none at all. Even though effective cross-examination is not
guaranteed, the opportunity to explore and reveal 2 13 factors which
hinder the truth-finding and reliability functions 2 14 of confrontation
and cross-examination must exist in all cases, rare or common. The
totality of the circumstances approach provides a simple and direct
method to evaluate the opportunity afforded the defense to expose
factors which mar testimony and possibly render the testimony unreliable. By utilizing the totality of the circumstances approach and
examining both out-of-court and in-court testimony, a court is better able tojustify the jury's reliance or lack of reliance on the out-ofcourt testimony in arriving at its verdict. Without the opportunity to
expose witness deficiencies, the constitutional right of confrontation
and accompanying cross-examination will be reduced "to a hollow
2 15
formalism."
209 Brief for Petitioner at 14, United States v. Owens, 108 S. Ct. 838 (1988)(No. 86-

877).
See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)(per curiam)(emphasis added).
212 Id. at 22 (emphasis added). See supra note 61 and accompanying text for the quote
in its entirety.
213 Id. at 22.
214 Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2662, 2664 (1987).
215 United States v. Owens, 108 S. Ct. 838, 849 (1988)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
210
211
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OWENS'S "SUBJECT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION"

STANDARD UNDER

FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 801(d)(1)(C)

As an alternative to the confrontation clause argument, the respondent argued that Federal Rule of Evidence 802 was violated by
the admission of Foster's out-of-court identification. 21 6 Justice
Scalia disagreed and read "subject to cross-examination" as merely
guaranteeing the procedures of placing the sworn witness on the
stand and obtaining answers voluntarily from the witness. 21 7 Once
more, although Justice Scalia concluded correctly that Foster's outof-court statement was not hearsay, Justice Scalia arrived at his conclusion with erroneous and unsupported reasoning.
The majority read the "subject to cross-examination" provision
of Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d) (1) (C) very broadly and thus sacrificed the substantive aspect of the Rule in favor of procedure. Justice Scalia noted that memory loss does not undermine crossexamination, but can be used effectively in cross-examination to
"destroy the force of the prior statement."2 1 8 Such loss of memory, according to the Court, when accompanied by cross-examination, satisfies the "subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement" provision of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) (1)(C).219
Although "concerning the statement" does not involve the subject
matter of the statement, 2 20 it does involve more than the simple
procedure of cross-examination of a witness who has experienced
memory loss, which precludes the witness from remembering the
22
basis for the identification. '
The reports from the House and Senate Committees on the desirability of adopting Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) (1) (C) illustrate the underlying reasons behind the recommendation for
adoption of the Rule. The most important reason for adopting Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) was because "the trier of fact...
216 Id. at 843. The court of appeals agreed and held that Foster's loss of memory

precluded Foster from being "subject to cross-examination," a requirement of Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C), which is an exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 802.
Owens, 789 F.2d at 757.
217 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 844.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 See Brief for Petitioner at 15, United States v. Owens, 108 S. Ct. 838 (1988)(No.
86-877).
221 See generally 4J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 801-176 to -178
(1987); Brief for Respondent at 26, United States v, Owens, 108 S. Ct. 838 (1988)(No.
86-877); S. REP. No. 199, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 355, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1092, 1093. (All

sources agree that a court must examine all circumstances surrounding the identification
before determining that confrontation standards have been met.).
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cannot properly perform its function if highly probative and constitutional identification evidence is kept from it."222 If the out-of-court
identification has been considered "highly probative," then the
qualities which make the identification probative should be able to
be explored. This interpretation comports not only with the Senate
Report, but also with the House Report which mandated not only
that cross-examination concerning the statement be satisfied, but
22 3
also that constitutional due process requirements be satisfied.
According to the House Report, "[t]he due process standard requires looking at the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether the identification procedure was 'unnecessarily suggestive
and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification.' "224 If the
constitutional standards are not met, then, according to the House
2 25
Report, the out-of-court statement is not admissible.
In order to enhance the policies behind Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) and to examine the "totality of the circumstances," something more than the mere procedure of placing the
sworn declarant on the stand and cross-examining him or her, without regard for the value of the responses obtained, is required. Indeed, the Senate Report confirms this interpretation. In justifying
the desirability of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C), the Senate
Committee stated that cross-examination "assures that if any discrepancy occurs between the witness' in-court and out-of-court testimony, the opportunity is available to probe, with the witness under
oath, the reasons for that discrepancy so that the trier of fact might
2 26
determine which statement is to be believed.
Thus, Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d) (1) (C) does require more
than the mere procedure of cross-examination. In fact, Weinstein
noted that, "if the identifying witness claims no memory of the
events defendant is charged with and cannot testify to the basis for
the identification, his cross-examination is of no value since there
will be no way of evaluating the probative force of the identification." 2 27 While this interpretation may seem to be a little extreme
at first glance, Weinstein's interpretation exemplifies that the important aspect of Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(1) (C) is the ability to
"evaluat[e] the probative force of the identification. ' 2 28
222 S. Rep. No. 199, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1975)(emphasis added).
223 H.R. Rep. No. 355, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 2, reprintedin 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1092, 1093.

224 Id. (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 691 (1972)).
225 Id.

226 S. Rep. No. 199, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975).
227 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 801-178 (1987).
228 Id.
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As a result, the Court's comparison of Federal Rule of Evidence
801 (d)(1) (C) with Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) (3)229 approaches
irrelevance. Although it is true that Federal Rule of Evidence
804(a) (3) contains a provision concerning witness memory loss of a
statement made, while Federal Rule of Evidence 80 1(d) (1) (C) does
not, it does not follow that witness memory loss does not enter into
the determination of whether the witness was "subject to cross-examination concerning the statement. ' 23 0 As suggested by the
House and Senate Committee Reports, the passage of time weakens
one's memory and also opens up the opportunity for outside influences to cloud one's recollection. 23 1 While the very purpose, then,
of allowing the admission of out-of-court statements of identifica23 2 it
tion is to increase reliability and fairness during a criminal trial,
does not follow that witness memory loss of the basis for the identification was a reason behind the desirability of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C). Nowhere in the House and Senate Committee
Reports does it discuss "witness forgetfulness of an underlying
event." 23 3 Instead, the reports focus on the reliability and accuracy
of out-of-court statements of identification. Any forgetfulness of the
basis for the identification which may follow the out-of-court state23 4
ment was not considered in the Committees' evaluations.
In any event, cross-examination of Foster meets the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C), which allows exceptions to hearsay. Cross-examination revealed that Foster could
not remember seeing his assailant, but could recall that his assailant
had used a metal pipe, what injuries were inflicted upon him by his
assailant, the location of the beating, jamming his finger into his attacker's chest, and choosing Owens' picture from an array of photographs presented to Foster by Mansfield. 23 5 Foster could also recall
that, when he initially identified Owens as his assailant to Mansfield,
he knew why he had identified him, although at trial, Foster could
For the relevant text of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3), see supra note 90.
See generally H.R. REP. No. 355, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprintedin 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 1092, 1093 (due process mandates looking at the "totality of the
229
230

circumstances").
231 Id. at 3; S.

REP.

No. 199, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975).

232

Id.

233

United States v. Owens, 108 S. Ct. 838, 844 (1988).
See generally H.R. REP. No. 355, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1975 U.S.

234

CODE

NEWS 1092, 1093; S. REP. No. 199, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1975).
(Neither committee cited forgetting the basis for an identification in determining
whether to recommend FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(C).).
235 Brief for Petitioner at 8-9, 14, United States v. Owens, 108 S. Ct. 838 (1988) (No.
86-877).
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no longer remember why. 23 6 Consequently, Foster was subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement, for the respondent
was able to probe Foster's out-of-court statement of identification
through cross-examination on account of Foster's detailed, but "se23 7
lective," memory.
C.

THE COURT'S UNSUCCESSFUL RECONCILIATION
OF EVIDENCE 801(d)(1)(C)

OF FEDERAL RULE

WITH FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE

804(a)(3)

The respondent argued that applying Federal Rule of Evidence
801 (d) (1) (C) to situations in which a witness' memory loss precludes
him or her from making an in-court identification or from elaborating upon the details or the basis for a prior, out-of-court identification creates an inconsistency within the Rules between Federal Rule
23 8
of Evidence 801 (d)(1) (C) and Federal Rule of Evidence 804 (a) (3).
Justice Scalia responded to this by stating that there is no "substantive inconsistency" but merely a "semantic oddity" between the two
Rules. 239 Such an interpretation is an inadequate answer to a very
real concern that it is impossible for a witness with memory loss to
be "subject to cross-examination" under Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(1)(C), because a witness with memory loss is deemed "unavailable" under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3).240
The Court suggested that "Unavailability as a witness" is
merely a "rubric" which could just as easily have been designated:
"Unavailability as a witness, memory loss, and other special circumstances. '"241 However, the Court did not give any support for this
interpretation. In fact, Justice Scalia concluded the majority opinion
with circular reasoning. The majority offered a hypothetical situation in which a witness claims memory loss of the facts of prior testimony which is inconsistent with the witness' present trial
testimony. 24 2 Justice Scalia asserted that it would be odd to render
the prior, inconsistent statement inadmissible because of the mem236 United States v. Owens, 789 F.2d 750, 764 (9th Cir. 1986)(Boochever, J.,
dissenting).
237 Id. (Boochever, J., dissenting).
238 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 844.
239 Id.
240 Id.

241 Id.
242 Id. at 845. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A), which states:
A statement is not hearsay if... (1) The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and
is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A)
inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition.
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ory loss. 245 The Court continued by reaffirming the "verbal curiosity" that the witness is simultaneously "subject. to crossexamination" and "unavailable." 2 44 Justice Scalia completed his argument by stating what he termed the obvious: "[q]uite obviously,
the two characterizations [i.e. "subject to cross-examination" under
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) and "unavailable" under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) (3)] are made for two entirely different
purposes and there is no requirement. or expectation that they
should coincide." 24 5 Justice Scalia did not restate his "semantic
oddity" argument, but instead, finished by coming full circle, back
to the inconsistency argument he dismissed earlier. The "semantic
oddity" characterization thus appears to have been an unnecessary
diversion, for it adds nothing more to Justice Scalia's conclusion
that neither the confrontation clause nor Federal Rule of Evidence
802 was violated by the admission of John Foster's out-of-court
246
statement of identification.
D.

THE EFFECTS OF OWENS ON FUTURE INSTANCES OF WITNESS
MEMORY LOSS

Finally, Justice Scalia failed to address the possible consequences of placing a sworn witness on the stand who "responds willingly to questions, ' 247 but is not able to testify as to any
circumstances surrounding the incident, nor as to the basis for the
prior, out-of-court identification. According to Justice Scalia's procedure-before-substance interpretation of both the confrontation
clause and Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C), the accused has
been given the "'."opportunity for effective cross-examination" '."
guaranteed by the confrontation clause 248 and the hypothetical witness has been "subject to cross-examination" under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(1)(C). 2 49 Such a result, however, seems quite aberrant in light of the very real possibility that the witness could have
250
been mistaken in his or her identification.
243 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 845. Thus,Justice Scalia noted that the semantic inconsistency
exists with all the subsections of Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(1) and not just with
Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d) (1) (C). Id.
244 Id.

245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 844.

248 Id. at 842 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 2664 (1987) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)(per curiam))(emphasis in original)).
249 Id.

250 H.R. Rep. No. 355, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprintedin 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1092, 1096 (statement of Rep. Holtzman).
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In essence, the Court left no room for future courts ever to
hold out-of-court testimony to be inadmissible. For, under the
Court's analysis, "[t]he identification could be admitted even if:
(1) The witness subsequently retracted it, and (2) the identification
were made under highly suggestive circumstances." '2 5' The majority's broad interpretation of cross-examination "open[s] the doors
wide to the admission of all kinds of out-of-court eyewitness identification." 25 2 Such a flood of admissions would undermine the essential reasons for allowing out-of-court statements to be admissible,
53
i.e., increased reliability and increased fairness in criminal trials.2
Indeed, if carried to the greatest extreme, Justice Scalia's reasoning
would allow the admission of a prior, out-of-court identification of
any willing witness on the stand who answers questions, even if all
of the answers were "I forget" or "I do not know."
Answers such as these are constitutionally insufficient, especially when the witness, unlike Foster, further claims no memory of
the surrounding circumstances. Justice Scalia, by not mentioning in
his analysis Foster's memory of some of the circumstances surrounding the attack, left open the possibility that a witness who testifies that he or she cannot remember the basis for his or her out-ofcourt testimony, and who also has no memory of any circumstances
surrounding the incident, can effect the conviction of the accused.
Such an interpretation of the majority's reasoning is even more
compelling in light of Justice Scalia's failure to define or explain
what "willingly responds to questions" means. In its broadest interpretation, this phrase could mean that a witness willingly responds
"I do not know" or "I forget," while never giving substantive answers. In its narrowest interpretation, this phrase could mean that a
witness willingly and affirmatively responds to questions with known
answers, while only sometimes responding "I do not remember" or
"I do not know." Under either interpretation, the Court forces the
conclusion that, any answer, as long as the sworn witness willingly
responds, would satisfy the requirements of cross-examination.
Consequently, the phrase could be interpreted by courts in the future to mean that a willing witness who is unable to answer affirmatively any questions has been cross-examined under constitutional
and evidentiary standards.
By abandoning substantive standards of cross-examination and
by misinterpreting the import of the relevant legislative history, the
Id.
Id.
See H.R. REP. No. 355, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprintedin 1975 U.S. CODE
ADMIN. NEWS 1092, 1094; S. REP. No. 199, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975).
251
252
253
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Court left in question the impact in the future on cases with witnesses whose memories of surrounding circumstances are not as
good as Foster's. As a result, the Court's reasoning could lead us
down the path to absurdity in the future.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In United States v. Owens, the Supreme Court held that memory
loss by a witness, resulting in no memory of the basis for a prior,
out-of-court identification, does not violate either the sixth amendment confrontation clause or Federal Rule of Evidence 802.254 By
ignoring the limitations set forth in the relevant precedents and legislative history, the Court interpreted the scope of both the confrontation clause and Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(1)(C) in an overly
broad and erroneous manner.
According to the Court, all that is constitutionally required by
the confrontation clause is that the declarant be sworn in at trial and
cross-examined without restriction. The Court rationalized this interpretation by asserting that an essential objective of cross-examination is to elicit the fact that the witness has a bad memory,
accompanied by other discrediting factors, such as prejudices, carelessness, and the like.2 55 The Court further argued that under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C), "subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement" is satisfied when a sworn witness is
2 56
placed on the stand and willingly answers questions.
The Court's reasoning is erroneous based upon the legislative
history behind the Federal Rules of Evidence and a close reading of
prior case law on the confrontation clause. The Owens Court failed
to recognize substantive along with procedural aspects of cross-examination under the confrontation clause and "subject to cross-examination concerning the statement" under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d) (1) (C). Unfortunately, this defect in reasoning undermines both the purposes behind the confrontation clause to give
a complete opportunity to examine and expose the common deficiencies found in many witnesses' testimony, such as "forgetfulness,
confusion, or evasion," and to aid in the truth-finding and reliability
functions of confrontation and the purpose of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(C) to increase reliability and fairness by allowing
prior, out-of-court identifications. By abandoning substance in
favor of procedure, the Court created the illogical possibility that all
254 Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 845.
255 Id. at 842-43.
256 Id. at 844.
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out-of-court identifications of any cooperative witness, regardless of
the value of the cross-examination achieved, will be admissible at
trial. The Court's erroneous and extreme reasoning could lead to
an obstruction of constitutional and evidentiary justice with respect
to the confrontation clause and the Federal Rules of Evidence.
A better test involves an analysis of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the witness' testimony, such as witness memory
of facts and events and all of the evidence and testimony, to enable a
jury to evaluate the reliability of the testimony and the credibility of
the witness. Without such an approach, a defendant's confrontation
and evidentiary rights could be severely reduced. Based on the totality of the circumstances approach, Owens' rights of confrontation
were not violated, nor were his evidentiary rights to exclude
hearsay.
Although the Owens Court's ultimate result that Owens' confrontation rights and evidentiary rights were not violated comports
with present notions ofjustice, the Court's reasoning does not follow prior case law or legislative history. The Court's overly broad
interpretation of cross-examination and "subject to cross-examination concerning the statement" will unfortunately increase the possibility that future defendants will be convicted by out-of-court
identifications given without an oath and without recollection of
either the basis for the identification or any of the circumstances
surrounding the incident. The imminent possibility of such a result
creates quite an unwarranted and dismal picture of the future of the
rights of defendants in our system of criminal justice.
CLAIRE L. SELTZ

